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Beginning with Friedrich Ratzel, the founders of migration studies all mentioned the natural environment as an
important determinant of human mobility. As migration theories grew in coherence and complexity over the
course of the twentieth century, however, environmental considerations generally disappeared from explanations
of displacement. They would reappear in a largely unconnected discourse stressing the threat of future waves of
“environmental migrants” in the end-of-the-century context of climate change anxiety. This alarmist stance was
heavily criticized by several migration scholars during the same period of time as a corpus of empirical studies
emerged that reconsidered the possible impact of the environment on migration. The purpose of this article is
to analyze the intellectual history of this swing of the pendulum. The first part examines the rationale for the
temporary disappearance of the environment from migration studies, as this major shift has not yet been fully or
systematically studied. The second part considers the renewal of interest in environmental migration. Finally, the
last part argues that although a solid body of new research documents the contemporary migration–environment
nexus, additional work is needed to reembed the environment more firmly within migration theories, taking into
account the increased focus on the nature–society nexus, which has recently expanded in geography. Key Words:
climate change, environment, environmental migration, migration theory, refugees.
Comenzando con Ratzel, todos los fundadores de los estudios sobre migracio´n mencionaron el entorno natural
como un determinante importante de la movilidad humana. Sin embargo, a medida que las teorı´as de la migracio´n
crecieron en coherencia y complejidad en el curso del siglo XX, las consideraciones ambientales generalmente
desaparecieron de las explicaciones sobre el desplazamiento. Ellas reaparecerı´an en un discurso en gran medida
desconectado que destacaba la amenaza de futuras oleadas de “migrantes ambientales” dentro del contexto de
ansiedad por el cambio clima´tico, a finales del siglo. Esta postura alarmista fue duramente criticada por varios
estudiosos de la migracio´n durante ese mismo perı´odo a medida que emergio´ un cuerpo de estudios empı´ricos que
reconsideraron el posible impacto del medio ambiente sobre la migracio´n. El propo´sito de este artı´culo es analizar
la historia intelectual de esta vuelta del pe´ndulo. La primera parte esta´ dedicada a examinar la racionalidad
de la desaparicio´n temporal del medio ambiente en los estudios de migracio´n, por cuanto este cambio mayor
todavı´a no ha sido estudiado ni completa ni sistema´ticamente. La segunda parte considera la renovacio´n del
intere´s en la migracio´n ambiental. Finalmente, la u´ltima parte sostiene que aunque hay un so´lido cuerpo de
nueva investigacio´n que documenta el nexo contempora´neo migracio´n-medio ambiente, se necesita ma´s trabajo
para reincorporar con mayor firmeza el medio ambiente dentro de las teorı´as de la migracio´n, tomando en cuenta
la creciente focalizacio´n del nexo naturaleza-sociedad, que se ha expandido u´ltimamente en geografı´a. Palabras
clave: cambio clima´tico, medio ambiente, migracio´n ambiental, teor´ıa de la migracio´n, refugiados.
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The story I would like to tell is one of a strangedisappearance and a sudden reappearance. Itstarts with the disappearance of the natural en-
vironment as a central factor for explaining displace-
ment in migration theories. It continues with its double
reappearance, both in the figure of the environmental
refugee, who has become the “human face of climate
change,” and in the corpus of empirical research de-
veloped with the aim of reassessing the impact of the
natural environment on migration.
In reconstructing this intellectual history, I in-
tend to establish a basis for reembedding the natu-
ral environment within migration studies. I want to
look at it not in a deterministic way, as a singular
and external driver of the movement of people, but
rather as the complex product of interactions between
nature and society. This attempt to place the environ-
ment within migration studies builds on several exist-
ing works, but I identify three important weaknesses
in these efforts. First, previous works tend to focus on
the recent emergence of the debate on environmental
migration without analyzing its previous disappearance
(Saunders 2000; Piguet 2010b; Gemenne 2011a). Sec-
ond, they often privilege general issues of population
change, development, and population policies rather
than migration (O’Neill, MacKellar, and Lutz 2001).
Third, some studies provide a general synthesis not fo-
cused on the evolution of the debate or its rationale
and only include “nonnatural” phenomena such as in-
dustrial hazards (Hugo 1996; Hunter 2005; Gill 2010).
Disappearance
A Central Dimension in the Work of the Pioneers of
Migration Studies
As noted by Harvey (1996), the word environment
“necessarily means such different things to different
people, that in aggregate it encompasses quite literally
everything there is” (117). If, to begin with, we apply
a narrow and rather simplistic definition of the envi-
ronment as encompassing all things occurring naturally
on Earth, we will quickly notice that environmental
drivers such as climate and soil fertility feature promi-
nently in the first attempts by geographers to systematize
knowledge about migration.
This is the logical consequence of the “naturalistic
subject” that geography was in its origins (Castree 2005,
57) and of the deterministic paradigm within which it
developed at the end of the nineteenth century, follow-
ing the lead of Ratzel. The role of the natural environ-
ment inmigration is central, although in a fairly implicit
way, to Ratzel’s (1882) Anthropogeographie,1 which, as
noted by Durkheim at the time, lays the foundations for
a general theory of migration (Durkheim 1899).
In this matter, the writings of the naturalist and
geographer Moritz Wagner, author of a book entitled
The Darwinian Theory and the Law of the Migration of
Organisms (Wagner 1873), were a significant influence
for Ratzel. Wagner does not deal with humanmigration
but with plants and animals, and his theory is more sym-
pathetic to Lamarck than to Darwin. Nonetheless, one
can guess that a statement like “The competition of all
beings for space, food, and reproduction, or the ‘struggle
for life,’ . . . gives the first impulse tomigration” (75) had
a strong impact on Ratzel, who referred to Wagner in
the Anthropogeographie as his highly respected, fatherly
friend.
For Livingstone (1992), “Ratzel’s Anthropogeographie
can best be read as an attempt to situate the new
science of human geography within the naturalistic
framework ofWagner’s Migrationsgesetz, which he por-
trayed as the [most] fundamental law of world history”
(199).2Ratzel’s disciple, theAmerican geographer Ellen
Churchill Semple, meanwhile, dedicated a whole chap-
ter of her book Influences of Geographic Environment
(Semple 1911) to “Themovement of people” (105–65).
She stated, “The search for better land, milder climate
and easier conditions of living starts many a movement
of people which, in view of their purpose, necessarily
leads them into an environment sharply contrasted to
their original habitat” (143).
Ravenstein—no doubt the most prominent figure
in migration studies at its beginning stages—was one
of the many to attempt to identify climatic zones fa-
vorable to the establishments of European colonists.
Following a similar idea, he argued for the paramount
importance of the natural environment to movements
of populations (Ravenstein 1891). A few years earlier,
Ravenstein had made the first explicit attempt to theo-
rize migration, stating a series of “migration laws” based
on the observation of internal migration within the
United Kingdom and international migration among
nineteen countries around the world. In that context,
Ravenstein mentioned an unpleasant climate as hav-
ing produced and still producing currents of migration.
He avoided taking an overly simplistic environmen-
tal determinist stance, however, by mentioning many
other drivers of migration, such as bad or oppressive
laws, heavy taxation, uncongenial social surroundings,
compulsion, and economic motivations (1889).
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A similar emphasis on the influence of the physi-
cal environment on human migration is to be found in
the work of the most famous figure of environmental
determinism in geography, Ellsworth Huntington. In
the context of his general project of highlighting the
geographic basis of human history (Huntington 1922),
Huntington is probably the first to describe what would
today be considered “climate changemigration.” Study-
ing the Lop area, in Eastern China, Huntington noted
that
During the first epoch [1830–1840] the Lop basin suffered
severely from drought. The villages of Dumuka, Ponak,
and others were abandoned for lack of water; and new vil-
lages were founded higher upstream. Distress of the same
sort prevailed in other places, and large numbers of people
moved to new sites. . . . The movements of this time are
unquestionably due to climate. (1907, 373)
More generally, his emphasis on the centrality of en-
vironmental drivers in history led Huntington (1907)
to argue that, at the dawn of the Roman Empire, the
great “barbarian” invasions of Europe were due to cli-
mate change in Eastern Asia and to the fact that
“Europe, after its long period of blighting cold, was be-
coming warm and habitable, and the migrants pressed
into it, horde after horde” (383).
Developing a fairly different theoretical framework
that, unlike that of natural determinists, stressed the
importance of cooperation and mutual aid in evolu-
tion, the geographer Piotr Kropotkin—now considered
a precursor to political ecology (Robbins 2004)—also
considered environmental pressure a central push factor
in emigration (Kropotkin 1902).3 In Kropotkin’s view,
emigration, by animals and humans, was indeed an al-
ternative to the “war of each against all” prophesied
by simplistic evolutionists as a possible reaction to in-
sufficient resources. He saw a third, preferred option in
mutual cooperation (Dugger 1984). This last example
confirms that, at the end of the nineteenth century, in
spite of epistemological differences, the early attempts
at theorizing migration agreed on a central role for the
natural environment.
The Eclipse of the Environment
Despite the historical premises just outlined, nearly
all traces of the environment as an explanatory factor
for migration disappeared from the growing body of
research on migration over the course of the twentieth
century. Landmarks of migration studies such asHuman
Migration and the Future by Gregory (1928; although
Gregory was himself a natural scientist),Human Migra-
tion by Taft (1936), and Economics of Migration by Isaac
(1947) do not even mention environmental factors
as causes of migration. Stouffer’s (1940) “intervening
opportunities” approach and Zelinsky’s (1971) attempt
to theorize the history of human mobility through the
concept of “mobility transition” similarly overlook the
environment. Ravenstein’s distant follower Lee men-
tions the natural environment in passing while listing
push and pull factors in his famous 1966 paper—“a
good climate is attractive and a bad climate is repulsive
to nearly everyone” (Lee 1966, 50). It does not figure
in the migration models developed by neoclassical
economists (Harris and Todaro 1970), however, nor
in the “gravity” and “ecological”4 models developed
during the 1970s (Sly and Tayman 1977), nor in
neo-Marxist theories of migration (Nikolinakos 1975).
The behaviorist current that developed in geography
during the 1960s had a significant interest in migration
(Wolpert 1965). Its theoretical framework considered
the decision tomigrate as the result of stressors affecting
individuals up to a certain threshold, beyond which
they led to relocation. Indeed, behavioral geographers
made common use of the term environment, but they
used it to cover economic conditions, governmental
policies, and transportation infrastructure much more
than natural characteristics such as climate. In the end,
natural phenomena were only marginally considered in
the behaviorist approach to migration. The same broad
use of environment can be identified in the pioneer
study that applied a general systems theory framework
to the study of internal migration (Mabogunje 1970).
The disregard of environmental factors is further ev-
idenced by the fact that none of the numerous syn-
theses of migration studies and theories published from
the end of the 1970s until very recently mention any
link between the natural environment and migration5
(Ritchey 1976; De Jong and Gardner 1981; Zolberg
1989). The same can be said of publications attempt-
ing to outline emerging trends, formulate new theories,
or broaden the disciplinary scope of migration theory
(Cohen 1995; Hammar et al. 1997; Massey et al. 1998;
Brettell and Hollifield 2007).
This historical overview confirms the observation
that migration studies lost sight of the natural envi-
ronment during the twentieth century. As stated by
Bilsborrow (2009), “Contextual factors have been
much discussed but little studied in relation to the
causes of migration, with environmental conditions in
origin areas hardly studied at all” (125). The pressing
question, then, is why?
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The Reasons Behind the Disappearance
There seem to be four main reasons for migration
studies’ decreasing interest in the natural environment
over the last century:
 The Western idea that progress implies a decreasing
impact of nature on human fate.
 The demise of determinism.
 The rise of an economic paradigm in migration
theory.
 The constitution of the specific field of refugee studies
around a political paradigm.
Many social theorists have stressed that Western
thought developed with a conceptual dichotomy be-
tween nature and society, leading to the conviction
that there is an inverse relationship between moder-
nity and the impact of the natural environment on
human actions (Sluyter 2003). To put it differently, as
Beck did recently, modern society “increasingly devel-
ops outside nature” (Beck 2010, 177) and the history
of mankind is the history of the conquest of nature
(Glacken 1967). This idea is clearly put forward in re-
lation to human migration in Petersen’s (1958) classic
Typology ofMigration and can be traced back to the work
of the nineteenth-century anthropologist Grote (1877)
on the peopling ofAmerica. For Petersen (1958),migra-
tion resulting from environmental factors (“ecological
push”) is indeed the first form of migration in history
due to man’s inability to cope with natural forces. It
should be called “primitive migration” (259), however,
because the influence of the environment on migra-
tion tends to decline to insignificance as humans grad-
ually gain mastery over nature through technological
progress.
The second and related factor leading to the demise
of environmental considerations in migration studies
is the vigorous rejection of natural determinism that
characterizes twentieth-century social sciences. One
reason for this rejection lies, of course, in the decou-
pling of nature and society that I have just mentioned.
For Sluyter (2003, 816), “environmental determinism
became anathema” because “as the nature/society di-
chotomy strengthened, it dictated that scientific dis-
ciplines have an explanatory intellectual core focused
on nature OR society.” Another reason, probably even
more important, is the naı¨vete of the monocausal ex-
planations offered by determinism and its propensity to
legitimize a shamelessly racist conception of the world
and a natural hierarchy of development to justify colo-
nial oppression. Both Semple and Huntington were
especially criticized for considering climate as amain de-
terminant for a racial sorting of mankind (Livingstone
1992). During the first half of the twentieth century, the
neo-Lamarckian geopolitical determinism pioneered by
Haushofer and his followers—a radicalization and po-
litical instrumentalization of the Ratzelian idea that
states compete, fight, and evolve the way that organisms
do in their natural environment—was also criticized as
highly problematic pseudoscience (Bowman 1942). It
was then largely cast out from the academy for having
served as an intellectual resource forNational Socialism
(O’Tuathail 1996).
Despite the demise of determinism, one could, of
course, argue that in geography, more than in other
disciplines, environmental considerations long retained
a certain explanatory power (Livingstone 1992). For ex-
ample, possibilists like Vidal de la Blache and the Ecole
Franc¸aise de Ge´ographie insisted on the limitedmargin of
freedom granted to mankind by nature despite the fact
that a given natural environment can be witness to the
development of many different sociocultural adapta-
tions (Vidal de la Blache 1922). Nevertheless, as noted
byCastree, on the eve ofWorldWar II, geographers had
become suspicious of making causal links between en-
vironment and society. Many simply chose not to study
the environment–society relationship at all and to spe-
cialize in either human or physical geography (Castree
2005),6 whereas others, following the influential work
of Sauer, largely reversed the direction of the causal-
ity to focus on the way that culture progressively af-
fected natural landscapes. During the second half of the
twentieth century, the quantitative revolution promul-
gated by the “New Geography” on the one hand and
by neo-Marxist geography and the subsequent school
of thought on the other effectively eliminated the last
remnants of environmental explanation in geographi-
cal theory. According to Castree (2005, 81), “Marxist
geography helped to expunge nature from human geog-
raphy during the 1970s . . . [and] so did behavioral and
humanistic geography,” with obvious implications for
the study of migration.
The third explanation for the decline of environ-
mental considerations is the growing dominance of an
economic paradigm in migration studies. The idea that
economic motivations drive migration behavior can be
traced back to Ravenstein himself. He considered that
“none of [the] currents [of migration] can compare in
volume with that which arises from the desire inherent
in most men to better themselves in material respects”
(Ravenstein 1889, 286).
4
Whether influenced by a structuralist (Castles and
Kosack 1973) or a neoclassical (Harris and Todaro
1970) point of view, economic theories of migration
clearly assumed a dominant role during the last quar-
ter of the twentieth century and pushed aside other
explanations, be they political, cultural, or environ-
mental. To be fair, it must be conceded that the neo-
classical theories do not naı¨vely and completely ignore
noneconomic considerations. Those other dimensions
become subsumed, in a certain sense, in the economic
explanations, in that they become part of a vector of
variables that translates into differences of wage produc-
tivity or rent between regions and countries. To put it
concretely, a bad climate or threatening natural hazards
that might act as repulsive factors will also depress the
level of rents and force employers to pay higher wages to
retain the workforce. This adaptation will lead to an in-
crease in the attractiveness of the area and—according
to this school of thought—to an optimal distribution of
populations. Hunter (2005, 277) offered a table of the
“placement” of environmental hazards in classic migra-
tion theories that illustrates this point.
The environmental component is evenmore present,
although still implicit, in the new economics of migra-
tion (Stark and Bloom 1985). This school of thought
has developed a specific interest in the collective han-
dling, within households in rural societies, of risk factors
such as drought and bad weather. Strategies of diversi-
fication regarding such risks are considered paramount
in explaining emigration but are driven by probabilistic
calculations about future wages. Although these theo-
ries can thus be said to take environmental push and
pull factors indirectly into account, neither directly dis-
cusses nor empirically addresses these phenomena and
their specific impact on migration.
A fourth explanation for the absence of environ-
mental considerations in end-of-the-century migration
studies specifically concerns the development of what
was initially labeled refugee studies, a field more often
identified nowadays as forced migration studies and
that developed, during the 1980s, to a large extent in-
dependently from mainstream migration studies (Black
1993, 2001b; Black and Robinson 1993; Chimni 1998).
The label of forced migration could very well have
also covered displacements due to environmental push
factors, but the fact is that these have been largely
absent from the field. This delineation is well exem-
plified in the editorial introduction to the 2007 special
issue of Refugee Survey Quarterly entitled “Researching
Refugees: Lessons, Challenges and Ways Forward,”
which fails to include environmental push factors in
its otherwise broad outline of forced migration studies
(Bakewell 2007). The explanation for this lies in the
strong link that exists between refugee studies and the
constitution of the “refugee” category in international
law. In that context, it is the political dimension that,
beginning with the 1951 United Nations Convention,
shaped a conceptual frame of reference that excluded
the natural environment as a cause of refugee flight.
Mentioning only the “well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political
opinion” (United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, article 1, §A, 2), the United Nations
Convention typically excludes environmental motives.
Forced migration studies are thereby confined within
a political paradigm in which, as formulated by Marx
(1990, 200), “states make refugees.”
A noteworthy exception to the dominant political
paradigm in forced migration studies is the work of
Richmond, one of the few scholars who can be con-
sidered a theoretician of forced migration. As early as
the beginning of the 1990s, he included environmen-
tal variables in his explanatory framework along with
social, economic, political, and technological ones and
underlined both the difficulties in defining, identifying,
and counting this group of displaced people and the
necessity to intensify research (Richmond 1994). This
pioneering work, however, did not suffice to establish
the field within migration studies.
Taken together, the four factors that I have just re-
viewed appear to explain the abandonment of the nat-
ural environment within migration studies rather well.
Before considering how the natural environment has
recently made a spectacular—although controversial—
comeback, let me mention one interesting exception to
the historical development described here.
Natural Assets as Pull Factors
The economics of amenities and migration consti-
tute one specific field of migration studies where the
environment has been considered as retaining a cer-
tain explanatory power, most often as a pull rather
than as a push factor. Initiated by the work of Ullman,
this current of research focuses mainly on internal mi-
gration. According to Ullman (1954), internal migra-
tion within the United States is, to a growing extent,
explained by “pleasant” climate and other favorable as-
pects of the environment. Indeed, if one remembers
that the push factor related to poverty had often been
considered paramount in previous studies of migration,
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Ullman can be considered a post–economic-scarcity
theoretician. In the optimistic context of the early
1950s in the United States, Ullman forecasted that
“for the first time in the world’s history pleasant liv-
ing conditions—amenities—instead of more narrowly
defined economic advantages are becoming the sparks
that generate significant population increase. . . . The
new frontier of America is thus a frontier of comfort,
in contrast with the traditional frontier of hardship”
(119). In this sense, Ullman replaces the third argu-
ment (dominance of an economic paradigm) for not
including environment in migration studies.
In the years since Ullman’s forecast, several em-
pirical investigations have confirmed the pull effect
of the climate—if not the disappearance of economic
factors—on migration (Greenwood 1969; Svart 1976;
Graves 1980). Researchers in the area of amenities and
migration, however, have rarely attempted to broaden
their scope of investigation or to isolate the natural en-
vironment as a pull factor. It is in a different context that
it has made a comeback within the migration agenda.
Reappearance
The disappearance of the environment from migra-
tion studies over the course of the twentieth century
was to be followed by a resurgence. In the second half
of the 1980s the publication of three reports, one by
the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP),
one by the Worldwatch Institute, and one by the In-
tergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC;
El-Hinnawi 1985; Jacobson 1988; IPCC 1990), played
an important role in reconnectingmigration and the en-
vironment on a global scale. The UNEP report brought
the term environmental refugee to the fore, and the IPCC
report very explicitly forecast that “[Global warming]
could initiate large migrations of people, leading over a
number of years to severe disruptions of settlement pat-
terns and social instability in some areas” (IPCC 1990,
20). A first series of scientific debates, international
conferences, and publications followed (Appleyard
1992; Lassailly-Jacob and Zmolek 1992; Suhrke 1994).
It was only fifteen years later, however, that the fear
of environmentally motivated mass migration gained
full visibility as the IPCC forecast reappeared in Sir
Nicholas Stern’s review of the economic consequences
of global warming: “Greater resource scarcity, desertifi-
cation, risks of droughts and floods, and rising sea levels
could drive many millions of people to migrate” (Stern
2007, 128). These concerns had a tremendous impact.
They led to alarming reports by major nongovern-
mental organizations (Christian Aid 2007; Friends of
the Earth 2007; Jakobeit and Methmann 2007), were
addressed by prominent policymakers (UN Secretary-
General 2009), and made for innumerable headlines
in the media (Gemenne 2011a). Seven complementary
lines of explanation can be suggested to explain this
renewed interest. Several of them (1, 2, 6, and 7 that
follow) signal a reversal of the evolutions that explained
the disappearance of the environment from migration
theories in the first place, whereas others (3, 4, and 5)
involve new trends. Looked at another way, some (1, 2,
and 3) are related to the reemergence of environmen-
tal migration inmainly nonscientific discourse, whereas
others (4, 5, 6, and 7) are more specifically connected
to academic research.
1. The progressive rise of environmental concerns
in Western societies, pioneered by early warnings
such as Vogt’s (1948) Road to Survival—which
was incidentally the first to mention the issue of
ecological migration—and leading to the refram-
ing of the environment as a central issue in the
“global risk society” (Beck 2009).
2. The increasing number of environmental haz-
ards documented on a global level and apparently
leading to cases of mass displacement (Hunter
2005). This also cast doubts on the “primitive”
character of environmental migration and on the
Promethean dream that nature’s impact on the
fate of humanity might be decreasing with devel-
opment and progress.
3. Growing anxieties regarding climate change,
which has become a “key category [of concern]
of the twenty-first century” for the international
community (Urry 2011, 24). Unlike abstract
physical indicators such as temperature or humid-
ity, migrants embodied a peril in the making and
soon became “iconic markers” of climate change,
alongside the Amazon rainforest and polar bears.
“Thehuman faces of climate change,” as theywere
called by the chair of the IPCC,7 thus provided
an “engaging simplification” (Li 2002) as well as a
powerful advocacy tool for environmentalists and
other actors (McNamara 2007; Gemenne 2011a).
4. The very politics of climate science.Over a span of
twenty years, climate science experienced a “tri-
umphant rise to political saliency” (Hulme 2009a,
137; Bolin 2007), thus attracting the attention of
social scientists to climate change and its social
consequences, migration being one of the most
obvious. This general trend toward an opening
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of climate change research to the social sciences
is reflected in the evolution of the IPCC reports
from 1990 through the 2014 project. It led to
the coining of the term climate refugee in addition
to the already existing term environmental refugee
(Biermann and Boas 2010).
5. The security framework that was set up after 11
September 2001, which interacted to an increas-
ing degree with both migration studies (Lazaridis
2011) and climate change studies (Barnett 2003;
O. Brown 2008; White 2011). This interaction
contributed to the framing of the link between
environment andmigration as a threat to “climate
security” (MacGregor 2009; Elliott 2010) and to
a connection between migration and the geopol-
itics of climate change (Hulme 2008a; Gemenne
2009). This was illustrated in a report by the Cen-
ter for Naval Analysis on security and climate
change stating, “The greatest concernwill be [the]
movement of asylum seekers and refugees who
due to ecological devastation become settlers”
(CNA’s Military Advisory Board 2007, 18) and
in the United Nations Security Council’s first de-
bate on the impacts of climate change, on 17April
2007, where the fear of migration took a promi-
nent place (McNamara 2007; Somerville 2011).
6. The emergence of a disinhibited reading of the
impact of the natural environment on human
societies. We can see this kind of reading, first,
in the works of prominent figures (qualified by
critics as neoenvironmental determinists) such as
Diamond and Sachs (Radcliffe et al. 2010), the
latter incidentally warning the world to “Prepare
for a torrent of forced migration” due to envi-
ronmental changes (Sachs 2007). Such a read-
ing also emerges in the convergence, due to the
growing salience of migrant remittances in rural
development (Tacoli 2011), between research on
sustainable livelihoods in rural areas (Ellis and
Freeman 2005)—which had long taken the nat-
ural environment as a central concern—and mi-
gration studies.
7. The thinning of the demarcation line between
refugee studies and mainstream migration studies
(Bakewell 2007) and the growing emergence of
an academic interest, first in forced migration in
general (Chimni 2009) and then in mixed mi-
gration (Van Hear, Brubaker, and Bessa 2009).
Overall, this implied a shift within refugee studies
away from the political paradigm mentioned in
the first part of this article (Black 1998).
And yet, despite this new evolution, the envi-
ronment remained marginal in mainstream migration
studies, which were still largely determined by an
economic paradigm. Indeed, high-profile migration
scholars largely took the role of skeptics (Gemenne
2011a) or “minimalists” (Suhrke 1994) in what de-
veloped into a debate between them and “alarmists”
or “maximalists.” Simultaneously, a corpus of empirical
research developed along what I call a pragmatic line.
Let us now quickly summarize these three tendencies.
The Alarmist Discourse
During the 1990s, Oxford environmental scientist
Norman Myers personified, to a great extent, the most
alarmist forecasts regarding environmental migration
(Myers 1993). He stated that “the issue of environmen-
tal refugees . . . promises to rank as one of the foremost
human crises of our times” (Myers 1997, 175). His pro-
jection of 150 million environmental refugees by the
end of the twenty-first century, later upgraded to 200
million (Myers 2002), had a tremendous impact and still
appears in media and advocacy campaigns (Gemenne
2011b).
The alarmist discourse continues to follow these as-
sumptions and is often characterized by the use of ag-
gregate numbers of future migrants and by hydrological
metaphors of submersion such as torrents, streams, tides,
and waves of migrants (Gill 2010; Turton 2003). It of-
ten emanates from activists—ChristianAid’s (2007) fa-
mous “human tide” or the picture bookClimate Refugees
by the Collectif Argos (2010)—but also from authors
who are at the intersection of advocacy groups and
the academy. Examples include Kolmannskog’s (2008)
report for the Norwegian Refugee Council entitled
“Future Floods of Refugees,” L. Brown’s (2011) book
chapter “Environmental Refugees: The Rising Tide,”
or the United Nations University’s report “In Search of
Shelter” (Warner et al. 2009). Several publications in
peer-reviewed scientific journals or books also adopt
a more-or-less-pronounced alarmist stance (Westing
1992; Bates 2002; Biermann and Boas 2010; McLeman
2011). Bogardi and Warner’s (2009) commentary in
Nature announced “Here Comes the Flood.” Reuveny
and Moore (2009) recently wrote that “[a]s climate
change continues, environmental degradation will rise
in some areas, promoting out-migration. Migrants will
most likely come from LDCs [less-developed countries];
. . . as a result, there may be more legal and illegal at-
tempts to enter DCs [developed countries], which may
ultimately lose control over incomingmigration” (476).
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According to the alarmist stance, migration is not only
a consequence of environmental degradation but repre-
sents a catastrophe in itself. Migration is thus seen as a
proof of the necessity to act against climate change. This
explains why the concept of the environmental refugee
has quickly made its way into what Saunders (2000)
called the “environmental orthodoxy” despite the fact
that it was, from the beginning, strongly criticized by
several skeptical scholars from the field of migration
studies.
The Skeptics’ Reply
The term environmental refugee has been severely
criticized for about fifteen years now, two landmark
publications being a paper by anthropologist Gaim
Kibreab (1997) and a paper by geographer Richard
Black (2001a). Both of these publications denounced
the shaky empirical character and sloppy nature of most
work on environmental refugees and brought to the fore
the problem arising from positing a unidirectional link
between environmental change and migration. This
criticismwas echoed in amoremoderate tone byCastles
(2002), for whom “[t]he term environmental refugee is
simplistic, one-sided and misleading. It implies a mono-
causality which very rarely exists in practice. . . . [En-
vironmental and natural factors] are part of a complex
pattern of multiple causality, in which [they] are closely
linked to economic, social and political ones” (5).
Another serious criticism leveled at the alarmists
from the very beginning is that, by invoking the specter
of a flood of migrants toward rich countries, they le-
gitimize the closed-border policies of Western govern-
ments that are already hostile to refugees. Twenty years
ago, McGregor (1993) wrote:
In so far as the term environmental refugee conflates the
idea of disaster victim and refugee, its use brings with
it the danger that the key features of refugee protection
could be undermined and the lowest common denomina-
tor adopted. Because “environmental” can imply a sphere
outside politics, use of the term environmental refugee
may encourage receiving states to treat the term in the
same way as economic migrants to reduce their responsi-
bility to protect and assist. (162)
Researchers from the Global South have been
especially sensitive to this risk of overplaying the
hand of nature and downplaying the role of policies or
politics (Kibreab 1997). Such thinking has ultimately
contributed to a “myth of difference” between contem-
porary refugees from the south (viewed as economic
or environmental refugees) and past refugees from the
(Communist) north who were initially targeted by
the international refugee regime and epitomized the
image of (real) political refugees (Chimni 1998). This
point was later broadened by feminist scientists, who
criticized the “climate security” discourse as denying
the duty of Western countries to assist the victims of
climate change (MacGregor 2009, 127).
According to the skeptics, the alarmists’ neode-
terminism leads them to see a worsening of the
environmental situation as mechanically leading to dis-
placements, without any consideration of local particu-
larities, history, or culture. Hugo (2008) has labeled this
flaw the “tendency to equate populations at risk with
population displacement” (31). Alarmist researchers
tend to concentrate their analyses on measuring the
amplitude of the degradations and claiming the neces-
sity of new legal instruments to protect environmental
migrants (Byravan and Rajan 2006; Biermann and Boas
2010), without discussing the nature or complexity of
the links between the socio-environmental evolutions
and migration itself. The skeptics add that migration
should not be seen as a tragedy in itself but that, on
the contrary, it can form part of a proactive adaptation
strategy that should be encouraged (Bilsborrow 1992;
Thornton and Manasfi 2010).
The Pragmatic Stance
A modest but significant body of research has accu-
mulated in the last ten years that, without any claim or
ambition to numerically forecast flows ofmigrants, ques-
tions the role and weight of environmental factors in
already-occurring displacements and attempts to build
scenarios for the future. The most recent and ambitious
project in this vein is certainly the Foresight report
(Foresight 2011; see also Black et al. 2011). I briefly
summarize the main results of this line of inquiry here
according to a typology of empirical studies suggested
by Piguet (2010b; Piguet, Pe´coud, and de Guchteneire
2011).
Based on different types of environmental indica-
tors such as rain, drought, floods, or tropical cyclones
and other indicators such as socioeconomic situation
or demography, a first type of study uses quantitative
methods to isolate the impact of the environment on
emigration. This is done at the country level, for ex-
ample, in three recent papers (Afifi and Warner 2008;
Collier andHoeffler 2011; Smith, Bastin, andChewings
2011) and in numerous other studies at the regional
level.8 The degree of correlation varies greatly across
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these works, but environmental variables always appear
as only one driving force of migration among others,
obviously confirming the multicausality brought to the
fore by skeptics. No correlation at all has been found
up until now when the analysis was specifically focused
on asylum requests lodged in Europe rather than total
migration (Neumayer 2005), which is a very important
point, considering that alarmists have often seen asy-
lum as the channel through which migration pressure
would most likely be conveyed.
A second approach aims to consider processes on
the level of individuals or households by collecting
data on past or current migration, environmental pres-
sure, and socioeconomic context through large surveys.
One of the most cited studies using this approach was
conducted in rural Mali before and after a series of
droughts (Findley 1994). The results document no in-
crease in international emigration but, rather, shorter
cycle migration from food-short to food-surplus zones.
Studies using similar methods in Bangladesh (Paul
2005), Ecuador (Gray 2009), El Salvador (Halliday
2006), Nicaragua (Carvajal and Pereira 2008), Burk-
ina Faso (Henry, Schoumaker, and Beauchemin 2004),
Ethiopia (Ezra andKiros 2001), andNepal (Massey,Ax-
inn, and Ghimire 2007; Shrestha and Bhandari 2007;
Bohra-Mishra and Massey 2011) or using time-series
analysis in Mexico (Kniveton et al. 2008) also em-
phasize the complexity and indirectness of the linkages
between migration and environmental variables. Most
studies show that, if environmental conditions play a
role, they are more significant for local and internal mo-
bility than they are for international or long-distance
migration.
Finally, qualitative methods have constituted by far
the most widely used research design in recent years,
among other places in the context of the European
Union research program “Environmental Change and
ForcedMigration Scenarios (EACH-FOR)” (Ja¨ger et al.
2009). These studies use either interviews or small-
sample questionnaires among inhabitants of threat-
ened areas, contacts with privileged informants, or, in
some cases, source literature on historical analogues
(Arenstam Gibbons and Nicholls 2006; McLeman and
Smit 2006; McLeman et al. 2008). Most case studies
strongly support the multicausality thesis.
Despite the contributions of the empirical studies just
reviewed, many authors have noted that the amount of
systematic research into the links between migration
and the environment within the fields of geography
(Gill 2010) and of migration studies in general (Laczko
andAghazarm 2009; Tacoli 2009; Piguet 2010a, 2010b)
remains limited. Although there is renewed interest,
the research still suffers from a good deal of definitional
vagueness regarding the concepts employed, the un-
derlying mechanisms involved, the number of persons
affected, and the time frame and geographical scales
concerned.
As Hugo (2008) pointed out, “there needs to be
a quantum improvement in the knowledge base on
the interrelationships between environment and mi-
gration. This means better conceptualization and mea-
surement as well as more detailed cross-disciplinary
research” (49). A central thesis of this article is that
these insufficiencies in the research are attributable to
the long eclipse of the environment within mainstream
migration studies and its reappearance through the back
door in the work of alarmist environmental scientists.
As noted by Massey, Axinn, and Ghimire (2007), in
none of the disciplines of the social sciences did “en-
vironmental conditions figure as salient determinants
of migration decision-making,” while at the same time
“many environmentalists take as an article of faith that
population growth, environmental deterioration, and
out-migration are fundamentally interrelated” (3). The
extended analysis of the history of geographically in-
flected studies of migration undertaken in this article
shows that it is not sufficient to simply blame environ-
mentalists for their oversimplified vision of migration.
Rather, it is up to migration scholars—and perhaps es-
pecially the nature–society geographers among them
because of their frequent engagement with complex,
recursive human–environment interactions (Zimmerer
2010)—to attempt to reembed environmental factors
into their own theoretical framework while avoiding
naive neodeterminism.
Conclusion: Reembedding the
Environment in Migration Theories
In overview, the arc of migration studies in geog-
raphy and related fields has shown that, on the eve
of World War II, these specialists become suspicious
of making causal links between environment and soci-
ety. Human geography was indeed confronted with a
progressive denaturalization, which continued into the
second half of the twentieth century and had obvious
consequences for migration studies, where geographers
had always played a central role (Robinson 1996). In an
opposite move, on the other hand, geography then ex-
perienced a striking rediscovery of “nature,” no longer
conceived of as an external determinant of the fate of
societies but rather as a constantly evolving social and
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ecological product that is coproduced in myriad forms
(Zimmerer 2010). This “de-naturalizing (re)turn to Na-
ture” (Castree 2005, 92; Radcliffe et al. 2010) has had
limited echoes so far in migration studies (Gill 2010).
In addition, no connection seems to have been made
between mainstream migration studies and natural haz-
ard research despite the nondeterministic turn that this
last field took in the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury (Castree 2005). Cultural and then political ecol-
ogy have been similarly ignored by migration studies
(Robbins 2004). In my view, making such a connec-
tion could resolve the dilemma of how to account for
the environmental component of population displace-
ments without overemphasizing this factor as a mono-
causal deus ex machina. Seen this way, we can consider
the environment as one factor behind the social pro-
cesses of migration, albeit one that interacts with many
others, including power relations, class structures, eco-
nomic inequalities, colonial legacies, cultural and re-
ligious specificities, political organization, and gender
relations.9 As with all of these other dimensions, we
should see the environment not as external to soci-
eties but as the product both of objectively measurable
physical changes and of the subjective ways in which
societies make sense of these changes (Demeritt 2001;
Hulme 2008b, 2009b; Adger et al. 2009; Wisner 2010).
Looking backward, denaturalizing the impact of the
environment onmigration could lead to a fruitful recon-
sideration of “environmentally led” migration episodes
in past human history. Even Petersen’s plot of “prim-
itive migration”—the idea that the further back one
looks in human history or the further “down” at so-
called less developed societies, the more the envi-
ronment is an autonomous determinant of human
mobility—could be called into question. For example,
the thesis that the medieval climate optimum, which
lasted from the eighth to the thirteenth centuries, ex-
plains the colonization of Greenland by the Vikings
while their inability to adapt to the Little Ice Age that
followed led to their collapse (Diamond 2005) is being
convincingly challenged in its monocausality. Recent
in-depth archaeological investigation reveals the com-
plex human–nature arrangements at play (Dugmore
et al. 2009). In the same vein, we can reinterpret the
famine that occurred in French-ruled Sahel in 1911
and caused innumerable (and unnumbered) displace-
ments and deaths. It can be understood not so much as
a consequence solely of the lack of rain but as, instead, a
result of the drought’s deadly coincidence with the shift
in tax collection imposed by the colonial power, from
in-kind tax collection (crops) to cash tax collection (in
French francs), which largely destroyed the traditional
local coping mechanisms for drought (Afifi 2011).
Looking forward, denaturalizing the environment
could also help us to (re)interpret current processes
related to environmental hazards and to forecast fu-
ture developments regarding migration and climate
change. This was alreadymade clear afterHurricaneKa-
trina when researchers showed that the disaster, along
with the subsequent population displacements, had
much more to do with social and political causes than
with narrowly natural ones (Hartman and Squires 2006;
Gutmann and Field 2010). Even such generally ac-
cepted cases of unavoidable future climate-driven mi-
gration as the Pacific Islands or Bangladesh deserve such
a reinterpretation. InTuvalu, for example, a nation seen
by many as on the verge of a massive exodus (Bogardi
and Warner 2009), more nuanced studies show that
cultural interactions between religious beliefs and the
understanding of climate change significantly mediate
the way people perceive—and actually reject—the idea
of emigrating (Mortreux and Barnett 2009; Gemenne
2010). In Bangladesh (Findlay and Geddes 2011), as
well as in the Andes (Valdivia et al. 2010), two areas
considered to be acutely affected by climate change, en-
vironmental degradation has been shown to interact in
a complex way with other factors in shaping livelihood
and migration strategies. It intervenes as a contingent
additional burden in the context of preexisting cultures
of mobility where the population affected are not pas-
sive victims but purposive actors, with “different areas
having different knowledge of migration opportunities,
with differing assessments being made regarding the de-
sirability of moving” (Findlay and Geddes 2011, 150).
As the concept of the environmentalmigrant popped
up in the 1980s and 1990s in the environmental sci-
ences, with a definitely deterministic and simplistic fla-
vor, mainstreammigration studies were prone to largely
ignore or dismiss it. Such disregard is no longer an
option in the present context of climate change un-
certainties and renewed “environment talk” (Radcliffe
et al. 2010).Due to its anthropogenic component and to
its obviously social implications, climate change con-
stitutes a blatant illustration of the embeddedness of
natural processes within social, political, and cultural
ones. It developed without taking the natural envi-
ronment into account. The conceptual framework of
migration theories, which already deals with complex
networks of causality among economic, cultural, and
political processes at various scales (Brettell and Hol-
lifield 2007; Castles and Miller 2009), seems well pre-
pared to welcome back the natural environment as one
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among numerous interacting factors that shape people’s
decisions and needs to move. It should not be consid-
ered in a deterministic way, as a singular and external
driver, but rather as the product of complex interactions
between nature and society.
Notes
1. The impact of the environment remains implicit in Ratzel
due to the very general character of his theory and to the
use of the much broader concept of “soil” (Boden). When
he uses more concrete language, especially in his Political
Geography, Ratzel (1903) brings other explanatory fac-
tors for displacement to the fore, especially the growth of
population and the competition for space between differ-
ent populations, without explicit links to environmental
pressures. He nevertheless notes that natural barriers and
obstacles can slow down mobility.
2. The general idea of linking the evolution of the environ-
ment to the evolution of populations goes farther back, to
Malthus (1798), although he only mentions migrations
incidentally. As Saunders (2000) convincingly shows,
many of the publications that have brought concepts
such as environmental refugees to the fore are indeed still
Malthusian in their emphasis on the population–resources
nexus as the root cause of forced migration.
3. The same could be written about the pioneering empir-
ical research of Boas on Eskimo migration, in which he
adopted a nondeterministic approach to geography (Boas
1887).
4. The word ecological is not used here with its usual con-
temporary meaning but indicates that the unit of analysis
is not an individual but a group of people, usually cor-
responding to a geographical area. The term environment
used in this context has nothing to do with the natural
characteristics of the area but refers to population vari-
ables such as the density of habitation, the ethnic compo-
sition of neighborhoods, and so on.
5. In the case of De Jong and Fawcett (1981), the word
environment is only mentioned in the context of amenities
migration, to which I return later.
6. The way in which the climate as an environmental phe-
nomenon has been disregarded by geographers in general
illustrates this process quite well: “Embarrassed in the first
half of the twentieth century by the naive determinists,
geographers became increasingly happy to leave climate
well alone. Distancing themselves from the idea, climate
was left first to the physical geographers, who in turn
handed it over to the meteorologists who most recently
have been usurped by the Earth system scientists” (Hulme
2008b, 10).
7. Interview in the film Climate Refugees by Michael Nash.
8. The same type of analysis was performed betweenMexican
municipalities (2009), between Mexican provinces and
the United States (2003), in sub-Saharan Africa (2008),
in Ghana (Van der Geest, Vrieling, and Dietz 2010; Van
der Geest 2011), in Western Africa (Black 1998), in
Burkina Faso (2003), in India (2001), and among de-
veloping countries (Barrios, Bertinelli, and Strobl 2006;
Reuveny and Moore 2009).
9. See Tacoli (2009) and Neumayer and Plu¨mper (2007) on
that specific aspect.
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